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(ii)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent's Brief in its statement of the case (p.4) has
misstatements as follows:
It states that as a finding of f a<. i. ; the lower court found
"that the Air Terminal note contained other powers which negated
negotiability".

It made no such finding.

It merely made a

conclusion of law that "it contains other rights".

This court is

not bound by the lower court's conclusions of law.

On appeal,

any conclusion of law of the lower court may be reviewed de novo.
Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 US 1, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545
(1966).

Nor should the lower court's construction of a written

instrument even be persuasive.
321 P.2d 221 (UT 1958).

Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk

Lake v. Hermes Associates 552 P.2d 126

(UT 1976).

Arnold Machinery Co. *. Balls 624 P2d 678, footnote 9

(UT I9r

Buehner Block v. UWC Associates 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 7

(UT 1988).

The security agreement, not the note contained other

powers.
Respondent states as a finding of fact that the lower court
found that "First Federal was aware under the applicable statute
of a limitation in the companion agreement".

There is no such

finding and there is no limitation.
Respondent states as a finding of fact that the lower court
found that First Federal was aware "of a claim against the Air
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Terminal note".

There is no such finding and there is no such

claim (R. 498-501).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In paragraphs 13 and 14 of Respondent's statement of facts
(ps. 7,8) it is stated that the two subsequent notes executed by
Gump & Ayers to First Federal "replaced" prior notes.

The court

found in findings of fact numbers 14 and 16 that said notes were
"renewal" notes (R. 479).

ARGUMENT

The Note Does Not "Contain" Any Additional
Promises Other Than to Pay Money
Air Terminal correctly states that the promissory note to be
negotiable must contain no additional promise other than a promise

to pay money.

Air

Terminal's

argument

that

the note

"contains" additional promises because it makes reference to the
security agreement for additional rights is untenable.

It is the

separate security agreement which contains any additional rights,
not the note.

Air Terminal's argument is specifically negated by

the official comment on UCC § 3-119(2) which states:
Subsection (2) rejects decisions which
have carried the rule that contemporaneous
writings must be read together to the length
of holding that a clause in a mortgage
97/22-24
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affecting a note destroyed the negotiability
of the note. The negotiability of an instrument is always to be determined by what
appears on the face of the instrument alone,
and if it is negotiable in itself a purchaser
without notice of a separate writing is in no
way affected by it. If the instrument itself
states that it is subject to or governed by
any other agreement, it is not negotiable
under this Article; but if it merely refers to
a separate agreement or states that it arises
out of such an agreement, it is negotiable.
(Emphasis added).
The above quoted official comment specifically rejects decisions construing contemporaneous written documents together when
the question is the negotiability of the document, even though
otherwise the documents would be construed together.
cited in our original brief so hold.

The cases

The note is therefore a

negotiable instrument.
There Were no Limitations in The Separate
Agreement of The Rights Under The Note
First Federal was aware of the terms of the contemporaneous
agreement, but it was also aware of the fact that there were just
additional powers contained in the security agreement and not
limitations on the terms of the promissory note.
Air

Terminal

argues

that

under

the

security

agreement

Sunayers had a duty to indemnify Air Terminal against the Morse
problem.

Air Terminal then concludes that this indemnification

agreement is a limitation on the rights of First Federal under
the note and that therefore, First Federal cannot be a holder in

97/22-24
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due course.

Such an argument is fallacious because First Federal

did not assume any obligations of Sunayers or Gump & Ayers under
the security agreement.

First Federal therefore is not liable on

the indemnification agreement.

6 Am. Jur.2d Assignments §109.

Nor could Air Terminal offset against First Federal an indemnification claim that may arise against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers.
20 Am.
Terminal

Jur.2d
would

Counterclaim
have

a

Recoupment

right

and

to enforce

Setoff
the

§89.

Air

indemnification

agreement against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers but not against First
Federal whether the note is negotiable or whether it isn't.

The

indemnification is not a limitation and the note is therefore
negotiable.
Furthermore 70A-3-119 relied upon by Air Terminal for its
argument that a limitation in the separate agreement negates the
status of First Federal as a holder in due course does not support such a contention.

It provides:

70A-3-119
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any
transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or
affected by any other written agreement executed as a
part of the same transaction, except that a holder in
due course is not affected by any limitation of his
rights arising out of the separate written agreement if
he had no notice of the limitation when he took the
instrument.
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the negotiability
of an instrument.
Subsection (1) does not provide that knowledge of any limitation in a separate agreement makes the instrument non-negotiable.

97/22-24
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In

fact, subsection

(2) provides

expressly

agreement does not affect negotiability.

that

a separate

Also, subsection (1)

does not provide that if there is a limitation that that makes
the holder with knowledge thereof not a holder in due course.
The language of 70A-3-119(l) assumes that one is a holder in due
course even though there may be notice of a limitation.

Since it

provides that a holder in due course is only affected if he had
notice, subsection (1) assumes that he is a holder in due course,
whether or not he had notice.
The determination of whether one is a holder in due course is
set forth in 70A-3-302(l) which provides:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it
on the part of any person.
That says nothing about any knowledge of a limitation.
First Federal Had No Notice of a Claim or Defense
Air Terminal argues that First Federal is not a holder in due
course because it had notice of a claim or defense that its obligation under the note is voidable.

It argues that it is voidable

because of the "Morse problem", and that under 70A-3-304(1)(b)
First Federal is not a holder in due course.
des :

97/22-24
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That section provi-

(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if. . .
(b) The purchaser has notice that the obligation of any
party is voidable in whole or in part. . .
The note says nothing about the Morse problem.

The security

agreement provides only that Air Terminal will be indemnified by
Sunayers and Gump & Ayers against any reduction in the share of
the capital, net income, net loss or cash available for distribution to which Sunayers partnership interest would be entitled
based upon any claims against the partnership by Morse (section
12 of the security agreement).

That provision is strictly an

indemnification and gives no right whatsoever of avoidance of
either the note or the security agreement.

Therefore, there is

no claim or defense that the obligation was voidable.

First

Federal is a holder in due course.
Air Terminal next relies upon 70A-3-304(2) which provides:
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for
his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit
or otherwise in breach of duty.
The quotation used

at page

17 of Air Terminal's

brief con-

veniently omits the last phrase "or otherwise in breach of duty".
Obviously if the fiduciary Gump & Ayers has not violated any
fiduciary duty, the fact that some of the proceeds were used to
pay a legitimate debt from Sunayers to its general partner Gump &
Ayers would be irrelevant.

97/22-24
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inapplicable because of the last phrase "or otherwise in breach
of duty".
against

Not only did First Federal not have notice of a claim

the

instrument

but also there was and

Therefore, First Federal is a

is no claim.

holder in due course.

Furthermore, 70A-3-304(l) which defines a claim or defense
would

necessarily

exclude

defense is asserted.

a situation

in which

no claim or

Such is the situation here because Gump &

Ayers was entitled to retain that portion of the proceeds of the
loan it obtained.

Not only was there no breach of fiduciary duty

by Gump & Ayers, the general partner of Sunayers, Gump & Ayers
put its own credit on the line to help the partnership obtain the
financing it needed to pay off obligations, including that of the
partnership to Gump & Ayers.
Air Terminal misstates the position of First Federal when Air
Terminal at page 18 of its brief states that First Federal contends that "Sunayers, and not Gump & Ayers, was the debtor" on
the note to First Federal.

Air Terminal asserts that Gump &

Ayers, and not Sunayers, is liable on the note to First Federal
and therefore, Sunayers was not the "debtor".

That assertion is

correct, but all First Federal is arguing is that the loan from
First Federal to Gump & Ayers was made to cover "debts" of
Sunayers on its Sunflower project and that because the proceeds
were so used, there was no breach of fiduciary duty by Gump &
Ayers.

97/22-24
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"Claim" and "Defense" Are Not Synonymous
In the sense used

here, "claim"

connotes

an

affirmative

assertion of a right, whereas "defense" connotes opposition to
the assertion of such claim.

Had the terms been synonymous the

commercial code would not have used both terms in some instances
and only one in others.

The fact that in one situation it uses

defense or claim and in another reverses the order to claim or
defense is no indication that they are synonymous.
70A-3-304 defines
defining

a holder

the notice referred

to in 70A-3-302 in

in due course as "a holder who takes the

instrument without notice. . .of any defense against or claim to
it on the part of any person".

70A-3-302 provides:

(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument. • •
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it
on the part of any person. (Emphasis added).
As set forth in our prior brief, there is a differentiation
between notice of claim or defense as defined in 70A-3-304 subsection (1) and notice of claim against the instrument as defined
in subsection (2). It provides:
70A-3-304
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible
evidence of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise
so irregular as to call into question Its validity,
terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to
the party to pay; or
(b) The purchaser has notice that the obligation of any
party is voidable in whole or in part, or that all
parties have been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instru97/22-24
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ment when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for
his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit
or otherwise in breach of duty.
Air Terminal argues that 70A-3-306(d) uses interchangeably
"claim" and "defense" and that therefore, they are synonymous.
That section provides:
70A-3-306
Rights of one not holder in due course. Unless he has the
rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instrument subject to. . .
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds
the instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or
satisfaction to such holder would be inconsistent with
the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The claim of
any third person to the instrument is not otherwise
available as a defense to any party liable thereon
unless the third person himself defends the action for
such party. (Emphasis added).
There is no such interchangeable use.

That section states that

the claim of a third person to the instrument is not available as
a defense to a different party.
The significance of a differentiation is that Air Terminal is
wrongfully asserting that there was notice of a claim against the
instrument because Gump & Ayers negotiated the instrument for its
own benefit and thus, it is asserted, under
Federal could not be a holder in due course.

70A-3-304 First
As stated above,

the negotiation was not in breach of a fiduciary duty, so that
argument fails.

But even if that were a valid argument, First

Federal would still be a holder in due course because there is no

97/22-24
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claim against the instrument by Sunayers or anyone else under
70A-3-304(2).
Also 70A-3-306(d), the very statute Air Terminal cites as
using "claim" and "defense" interchangeably, bars Air Terminal
from raising the defense.

In this situation Sunayers is the only

third person who could assert a claim to the instrument.

Not

only is Sunayers not asserting a "claim to the instrument", Air
Terminal cannot assert a defense "unless the third person himself
defends the action for such party" which Sunayers has not done.
Thus, the wording of 70A-3-306(d) that "the claim of any third
person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense
to any party
defends

the

liable thereon unless
action

for

such

party"

the third person himself
bars Air

Terminal

from

asserting a defense regardless of whether or not First Federal is
a holder in due course.
First Federal Did Not "Close Its Eyes"
Air Terminal argues that First Federal closed its eyes to
apparent defenses.

Presumably, it is referring to what it pre-

viously asserted, that the note was voidable or that Gump & Ayers
as a partner in Sunayers benefitted from the proceeds of the
First Federal loan.
above.

Both of these are untenable as discussed

Hence, there is no basis for the contention that First

Federal "closed its eyes".

97/22-24
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CONCLUSION
Whether or not the Air Terminal note meets the requirements
of the commercial code for being a negotiable instrument depends
upon the terms on the face of the note.

The terms of the

security agreement do not appear on the face of the note and
therefore, do not destroy its negotiability.
First Federal is a holder in due course because it had no
notice of any defense or claim.
There is no contention by Air Terminal that First Federal had
any notice of the alleged fraud which Air Terminal asserts as a
defense.

Air Terminal should not be able to assert that fraud as

a defense against First Federal.
The ruling of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this i~)#L day of May, 1988.

/s/ John W. Lowe
John W. Lowe
Attorney for Appellant
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